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God and Nature in the Thought 
of Robert Boyle 
T I M O T H Y  S H A N A H A N  
THERE IS WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT among historians that the writings of Robert 
Boyle (1697-1691) constitute a valuable archive for understanding the con- 
cerns of  seventeenth-century British natural philosophers. His writings have 
often been seen as representing, in one fashion or another, all of the leading 
intellectual currents of  his day. ~ There is somewhat less consensus, however, 
on the proper  historiographic method for interpreting these writings, as well 
as on the specific details of  the beliefs expressed in them. Studies seeking to 
explicate Boyle's thought have been, roughly speaking, of two general sorts. 
On the one hand there are those studies of a broadly "intellectualist" orienta- 
tion which situate his natural philosophy within the intellectual context pro- 
vided by metaphysics, religion, and early modern science. In this connection 
his corpuscularianism has been shown to be motivated by specific epistemologi- 
cal, theological, as well as empirical concerns. One of  the central aims of such 
studies has been to show that apparently discordant elements in his scientific 
thought are rendered coherent by referring them to such "non-scientific" 
commitments. Among studies of  this sort might be mentioned the works of  
John Hedley Brooke, E. A. Burtt, Gary B. Deason, J. E. McGuire, R. 
Hooykaas, Robert H. Kargon, Eugene M. Klaaren, P. M. Rattansi, and Rich- 
ard S. Westfall. ~ 
' See, for example, E. Klaaren, The Religious Origins of Modern Science (Grand Rapids, Mich,: 
Eerdmann's, 1977) 199; E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, rev. ed. (New 
York: Doubleday, 1954), 167. 
2 John Hedley Brook, "Newton and the Mechanical Universe," in Towards a Mechanistic 
Philosophy (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 1974), 74-77; E. A. Burtt, 187-96; R. 
Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern Science (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1972), 17- 
19; Robert H. Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton (Oxford, 1966); E. M. Klaaren, 
164-76; J. E. McGuire, "Boyle's Conception of Nature," Journal of the History of Ideas 33, no. 4 
(Oct-Dec 1972); P. M. Rattansi, "Paracelsus and the Puritan Revolution," Ambix, xi 0963): 94-32; 
[547] 
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Othe r  studies adop t  what  may be called a "social contextualist" approach .  
These  studies emphas ize  the wider  cultural  context  in which Boyle wrote, and  
explain par t icular  metaphysical ,  theological, and  scientific features  o f  his writ- 
ings by re fe rence  to the social, political, and  economic motives he can be 
supposed to have embraced .  In  this genre  must  be ment ioned  b roade r  studies 
of  seven teen th-cen tury  England  by J a m e s  Jacob,  Margare t  Jacob,  Simon 
Schaffer,  Steven Shapin,  and  Charles  Webster.3 A sense o f  the kind of  conclu- 
sions scholars have reached  using this app roach  can be conveyed by consider-  
ing the following explanat ion  of  Boyle's view of  the relat ionship between God 
and nature .  Accord ing  to J a m e s  and Margare t  Jacob:  "[Conservative r e fo rm-  
ers like Boyle] deve loped  a metaphysics  o f  God and mat te r  that  author ized a 
conservat ive in te rpre ta t ion  of  the social h ierarchy and  answered the radicals 
by r ende r ing  their  social views un t r ue  in te rms  of  the conservative metaphys-  
ics. In  o ther  words,  a conservat ive mat te r  theory was constructed which 'out-  
lawed' radicalism f r o m  the universe."4 According to Shapin: 
To the social groups for whom Boyle spoke the radical sectarian threat had to be 
opposed, and one way of opposing it was to produce and disseminate a philosophy of 
nature and God which insisted that material entities were 'brute and stupid', that God 
was not immanent in nature, and that, therefore, nature, like a congregation and civil 
society generally, required for its activity the superintendence of external ordering and 
animating agencies . . . .  The natural philosophy of Boyle and the early Royal Society 
was generated with a view to these social and moral uses; it was evaluated partly on the 
basis of how well it could be used in those contexts.5 
On this a p p r o a c h  Boyle's view of  the relat ionship between God  and na ture  is 
unders tood  as derivat ive f r o m  social and political motives arising f rom an 
"The Intellectual Origins of the Royal Society," Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 23 
(Dec. 1968): 129-43; Richard S. Westfall, Science and Religion in Seventeenth Century England 
(Binghamton, N.Y.: Yale University Press, 1958), 83-92. 
3 James Jacob, "The Ideological Origins of Robert Boyle's Natural Philosophy," Journal of 
European Studies z (1972): 1-21; Robert Boyle and the English Revolution (New York: Burt Franklin 
and Co., 1977); "Boyle's Atomism and the Restoration Assault on Pagan Naturalism," Social 
Studies of Science 8 (1978): 211-33; Margaret Jacob, The Newtonians and the English Revolution 
~689-I72o (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976 ). J. R. and M. Jacob, "The Anglican 
Origins of Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of the Whig Constitution," Isis 71 
(198o): 251-67; Simon Schaffer, "Natural Philosophy," in G. S. Rousseau and R. Porter, eds., The 
Ferment of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, x98o), 55-91; Steven Shapin, 
"Social Uses of Science," in G. S. Rousseau and R. Porter, eds., 93-139; "History of Science and its 
Sociological Reconstructions," History of Science 2o (198~): 157-21 l; Charles Webster, "Puritan- 
ism, Separatism, and Science," in David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers, eds., God andNature 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 192-217; The Great Instauration: Science, Medicine 
and Reform 1626-I66o (London: Duckworth, 1975). 
4 James and Margaret Jacob 098o), 253-54. 
5 Steven Shapin (1982), 182. 
G O D  AND N A T U R E  IN R O B E R T  B O Y L E  5 4 9  
interest in maintaining the status quo by keeping the masses in check. Consid- 
erations arising from intellectual concerns, such as coherence with theological 
doctrines, philosophical acceptability, and scientific fertility, are themselves in 
need of  further, more fundamental explanation in terms of the socio-political 
factors obtaining in Restoration England. 6 
Each of  these approaches has contributed considerably to our appreciation 
of  the complex factors involved in the development and expression of  Boyle's 
thought. Despite this significant progress, however, there remain aspects of  
his writings on God and nature which have been relatively neglected. Social 
contextualist studies have provided us with valuable insight into the wider 
cultural milieu in which he wrote and the effect this may have had on the 
expression of  some of his views. But they have contributed little of value to the 
clarification of  the properly philosophical sources of his view, because they do 
not directly address the issue of  understanding the logical and metaphysical 
considerations which impose restrictions on the options that Boyle, given his 
other intellectual commitments, had to work within. Intellectualist studies, on 
the other hand, do attempt to address this issue, but the most widely accepted 
intellectualist interpretation of  his view of God and nature is, I shall argue, 
profoundly mistaken. Given Boyle's historical importance, and the centrality 
of  the relationship between God and nature in his writings, it becomes crucial 
to have an accurate account of  his views in this area. 
The present paper is intended as a contribution to this goal. The inade- 
quacy of  previous studies is due in part to a failure to fully appreciate the 
philosophical resources Boyle inherited as a seventeenth-century natural phi- 
losopher. Whether he realized it or not, the problems involved in articulating 
This taxonomy is due  to Shapin (198o). It should be pointed out, however, that the distinc- 
tion is not  an inviolable one,  and that these approaches  represent  ends  on a cont inuum with many 
studies falling somewhere  in the middle.  Thus  it is not the case that scholars o f  an intellectualist 
orientat ion are  oblivious to the social and political context  o f  their subject, nor  that scholars o f  a 
social contextualist  persuasion do not consider  what are above te rmed properly intellectual consid- 
erations. Indeed ,  in one  place James  Jacob (1977), a leading social contextualist, makes a remark  
which could easily serve as a motto  for the present  paper:  "Boyle's natural philosophy as it evolved 
in the 166os was, like the ideology o f  the Royal Society with which it merged,  the product  in part  
o f  some compet ing  philosophies and theologies. Since he defined his own thought  then in terms 
of  these others,  one  o f  the best ways of  unders tand ing  it and its origins would seem to be to study 
it in relation to this context  o f  compet ing  ideas---especially as this has never been done  before" 
(~59). Intellectualist and social contextualist  writers differ  mainly in the weight they place upon 
considerations o f  each sort, and in the relationship they see obtaining between such consider- 
ations. Social contextualists tend  to view social and political factors as more  fundamenta l  than 
scientific, metaphysical, and theological considerations,  and may interpret  the latter consider- 
ations as parts o f  the social context.  One  of  the points I wish to make in this paper  is that 
intellectualist considerat ions have explanatory and expository value of  their own, and therefore  
that they need  not be seen as derivative f rom social and political factors. 
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the relationship between God and nature were bequeathed to him by the 
interaction o f  Christian theology and Aristotelian philosophy of  nature in the 
Middle Ages. T h e  metaphysical concepts, distinctions, and terminology he 
used and modified in the light o f  his own prefer red  ontology were not devel- 
oped by him out  o f  whole cloth, but were transmitted f rom the medievals to 
him in various indirect routes.v In seeking to clarify and unders tand his writ- 
ings on God and nature there is, therefore,  no substitute for tracing this issue 
back to its roots in medieval discussions and controversies. The  results o f  ou r  
discussion based upon  this strategy will be a more  accurate unders tanding  of  
Boyle's view of  the relationship between God and nature, and a greater appre-  
ciation o f  the impor tance  o f  proper ly  philosophical factors in historiography. 
In o rder  to focus the following discussion I wish to set out at the start what 
I take to be the erroneous,  but  widely accepted, intellectualist interpretation o f  
Boyle's view found  in J. E. McGuire's 1972 article, "Boyle's Conception o f  
Nature. ''a McGuire's explicit aim is to correct an imbalance he sees in the 
his tor iography of  late seventeenth-century British natural philosophy. The  
"received opinion" holds that "the natural  philosophers of  the late seven- 
teenth century  viewed God's relation to nature  as primarily a first efficient 
cause." A n u m b e r  o f  consequences are said to follow from this interpretation. 
First, "emphasizing God's role as first efficient cause makes n a t u r e . . ,  rela- 
tively independen t  o f  God." Second, "scientific knowledge establishes nature  
as a self-contained, self-regulating, law-governed system which can be likened 
in its interrelations to a machine." Finally, the claim is made that "as nature 
came more  and more  to be conceived as a system of  laws relating matter and 
motion, the doctr ine o f  divine providence declined in i m p o r t a n c e . . ,  in natu- 
ral philosophy."9 
Against this reading he attempts to establish an alternative interpretat ion 
which takes as its foundat ion  the thesis that Boyle's "mechanical philosophy" 
7 And perhaps by various direct routes as well. Not infrequently in the Origin of Forms and 
Qualities (1666) he quotes from the Latin texts of medieval scholastic treatises like Aquinas' 
commentary on Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione and Suarez's Disputationes Metaphysicae, of 
which he apparently had the 163o Mainz edition. In his essay Of the Reconcileableness of Reason and 
Religion (1675) he criticizes some modern followers of Epicurus for their ignorance of "the 
Peripatetick arguments of Scotus and Aquinas." (Works, 4: 152-53) The conclusion seems un- 
avoidable that he was at least familiar with the issues discussed and the solutions proposed by such 
philosophers to the problem of understanding God's relation to nature. 
s McGuire's paper is frequently cited, but without any hint of its deficiencies. See, for exam- 
ple, J. Jacob 0977); E. M. Klaaren; M. A. Stewart, Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979). A similar view is expressed in Gary B. Deason, 
"Reformation Theology and the Mechanistic Conception of Nature," in David C. Lindberg and 
Ronald L. Numbers, eds., God and Nature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 167- 
91 . 
9 McGuire, 524 . 
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is, in part,  "a re formula t ion  o f  a nominalist ontology" which holds that "nature  
contains non-rela ted particulars." On this view "physical laws are categories 
imposed upon  nature  by the human  mind in the light of  the observed regulari- 
ties o f  exper ience."  From such premises McGuire derives the following inter- 
pretation: 
Since a nominalist ontology conceives particulars as unrelated, they are denied the 
power to cause change in and of themselves. God's will, therefore, is the only causally 
efficacious agency in nature. Hence there are no laws or causal connections in nature 
existing as entities over and above particulars conceived as events, bodies, or parti- 
cles . . . .  Thus nature conceived as a contingent artifact of eternal power is totally 
dependent on Providence such that it is the mere exemplification of rules or laws 
continually imposed by the latter . . . .  Hence there are no secondary causes in nature 
which are miraculously dispensed with by Providence; rather, Providence is God's 
continual action in nature.'~ 
Leaving aside the initial assumption that Boyle embraced a "nominalist 
ontology" (since it is not  at all clear precisely what this ascription amounts  to), I 
wish to focus on the central  question raised by this interpretat ion.  Are there,  
or are there  not, on Boyle's view, any "secondary causes" in nature? T h a t  is, do 
natural  entities exercise any genuine  causal power? Or  is God's will the only 
causal agency in nature? Against the "received opinion" that for  Boyle God's 
relation to na ture  is merely as first efficient cause, and consequently that 
nature,  once created,  operates  machine-like relatively independen t  of  God, 
McGuire deduces  an in terpreta t ion according to which natural  entities are 
denied causal power  o f  their  own, and thus all that happens  in nature  must be 
ascribed to God  alone. These  two interpretat ions stand at opposite extremes 
f rom one  another .  Neither ,  I shall argue, does justice to Boyle's view. T o  show 
this it will first be necessary to explicate what is involved in each o f  these views 
in some detail. 
1. T H E  " R E C E I V E D  O P I N I O N "  
For the purposes  o f  this paper  the "received opinion" McGuire rejects will be 
r e fe r red  to as deism. It is impor tan t  to point out  that this term has been 
associated with several d i f fe ren t  doctrines, only one of  which is relevant here.  
On the one hand there  is what can be te rmed "metaphysical deism." This is 
the technical philosophical view according to which God, or a First Cause, 
created the mat ter  o f  the universe, instituted immutable and universal laws o f  
nature  that preclude alteration, and thereaf ter  does not interact with the 
natural  world. This  view is primarily concerned to deny God's cont inued 
causal activity in nature.  On the o ther  hand there  is what might be called 
'~ ibid., 5~5-~6. 
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"historical  de ism."  T h e  historical  deists (mainly in the  seven teen th  and  eigh-  
t een th  centur ies)  d id  not ,  unl ike  metaphys ica l  deists past  and  present ,  alto- 
g e t h e r  d e n y  the  i m m a n e n c e  o f  God ,  bu t  were  pr imar i ly  critical o f  " revea led  
rel igion,"  and  thus  t e n d e d  to d e n y  the  necessity o f  special revelat ion in favor  
o f  "na tu ra l  re l igion,"  i.e., re l ig ion universal ly  achievable by h u m a n  reason.  
T h e  o p p o n e n t  he re  was no t  divine causali ty in na tu r e  per se, but  r a the r  reli- 
gious d o g m a  as p r o p a g a t e d  by ecclesiastical inst i tut ions and  authori t ies .  ' '  Re- 
gardless  o f  w h a t e v e r  re la t ionships  may  exist be tween  them,  these two versions 
o f  de ism focus  on  d i f f e r e n t  concerns .  At  issue he re  is the p rop r i e ty  o f  inter-  
p r e t i ng  Boyle  as a metaphysical deist. T o  avoid needless  con fus ion  it will be well 
to bea r  this po in t  in m i n d  in the  fo l lowing discussion. 
I n  o r d e r  to fix clearly in o u r  minds  the m e a n i n g  o f  metaphysica l  deism, it 
will be useful  to cons ide r  its medieval  f o r mu la t i on  and  some  o f  the a r g u m e n t s  
b r o u g h t  f o r t h  in its behalf .  I n  his c o m m e n t a r y  on  the "Sentences"  o f  Pe ter  
L o m b a r d ,  Will iam D u r a n d u s  de  Sa in t -Pourca in  (c. 1 2 7 o - 1 3 3 ~  ) d e f e n d e d  a 
min imal  role  fo r  God ' s  activity in the  o r d i n a r y  course  o f  na ture .  ~2 O n  his view, 
God  creates  " s e c o n d a r y  agents"  (God be ing  the  " p r i m a r y  agent")  and  con-  
serves t h e m  a n d  their  powers  in existence. '3 Given the a p p r o p r i a t e  c i rcum-  
stances,  the s e c o n d a r y  agen t  will exercise its p o w e r  and  the reby  b r ing  abou t  a 
cer ta in  character is t ic  effect  w i thou t  f u r t h e r  assistance f r o m  God.  
His a r g u m e n t s  fo r  this view were  based on  a cons idera t ion  o f  the g e n u i n e  
difficulties involved  in u n d e r s t a n d i n g  how God  and  a s econda ry  cause could  
both  be said to be immed ia t e ly  respons ib le  fo r  the same effect.  I f  God  acted  
immedia te ly  in the  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  the effect  o f  a s econda ry  cause, then  H e  
would  e i ther  act  by the  same act ion by which the  s econda ry  cause acts o r  by a 
different action.  Bu t  no t  by the  same action,  D u r a n d u s  a rgued ,  fo r  two reasons.  
First, a c r e a t u r e  can p e r f o r m  its character is t ic  action(s) wi thou t  God ' s  special 
" See E. C. Mossner, "Deism," in Paul Edwards, The En~clopedia of Philosophy (New York: 
Macmillan/The Free Press, 1967) , vol. ~, pp. 3~6-336. 
~2 William Durandus, In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum Libri IIII. 
(Venetiis, ex Typographia Guerraea, MDLXXI) Disputation 5, Question 1. (republished in 
Vols.: Ridgewood, N.J.: Gregg Press, Inc., 1964 . See 13od - 13 I d) ,  
,s We can also distinguish, as Durandus did not, between a "strong" and a "weak" form of 
deism, depending on whether or not it is thought that God must conserve an entity and its powers 
in existence in order for that entity to exercise its causal powers. The weak deist holds that for any 
created entity such that it has the power to act causally, God conserves this entity and its power in 
existence. This version is based on the conviction that natural entities are characterized by a 
radical contingency such that they would cease to exist were God withdraw his conserving power 
for even an instant. By "assuming the conservation of its nature and active power" (see below) 
Durandus sides with weak deism. The strong deist holds that God need not conserve such an 
entity in existence for it to exercise its causal power. Once created, it persists in being without 
God's conserving power. Weak deists are "conservationists," we might say, whereas strong deists 
are not. 
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influence (assuming the conservat ion of  its na ture  and  active power),  since an 
action which does not  exceed the power  of  the species of  the agent  is suffi- 
ciently elicited by jus t  the power  o f  the species; therefore ,  it would be superf lu-  
ous to posit ano t he r  immedia te  principle eliciting such an action. Second, it is 
impossible for  numerical ly  the same action to be f rom two or more  agents  in 
such a way that  it is completely and  immediately f rom each, unless they act by the 
same power  (i.e., by the same nature);  but  God and a c rea ture  cannot  act by 
numerical ly  the same power.  So God and a secondary cause do not act by the 
same action. 
On the o the r  hand,  God  and a secondary  cause also cannot  act by d i f ferent  
actions in the p roduc t ion  o f  the effect  o f  a secondary cause. This  is also 
suppor t ed  by two reasons.  First, if God and a secondary cause acted by differ-  
ent actions, then  e i ther  one  o f  the actions effects the thing p roduced  before  
the o ther  does, or  else both  effect  it simultaneously.  Not the former ,  because if 
God by His action p r oduced  the whole thing first, then the crea ture  would 
br ing about  no th ing  by its subsequent  action, and  vice versa. Nor  can it be said 
that  God produces  a par t  o f  the effect  and the crea ture  a part ,  for  then we 
must  ask whe the r  that  very par t  which the crea ture  produces  immediate ly  is 
also such that  God produces  it immediately ,  and  the same p rob lem arises all 
over  again. On  the o the r  hand,  it is not  the case that  both actions br ing about  
the same effect  s imultaneously,  because then one  of  the two actions would be 
superf luous.  Besides, two actions cannot  have the same terminus,  because 
actions are discr iminated by their  termini;  if God 's  action had the same termi-  
nus as the secondary  cause's, then  the actions would not be distinct. But  this is 
impossible. Hence ,  D u r a n d u s  concludes,  God does not act immediate ly  in the 
p roduc t ion  o f  the effect  o f  a secondary  cause. It  follows that  secondary causes 
act by their  own power  in br inging  about  their  effects. '4 
T h e  soundness  o f  these a rgumen t s  is not ou r  concern  here. '5 T h e  impor-  
tant  points to take note  o f  are the position Durandus  defends,  and  the kinds of  
considerat ions u p o n  which it is g rounded .  He  holds that secondary agents 
exercise their  power  and  br ing  about  characteristic effects without  any direct  
assistance f r o m  God.  For  every effect  that is b rough t  about  in nature ,  it is not 
the case that  God has to be acting immediately in the product ion  of  that  effect. '6 
This  view is based on logical and  conceptual  considerat ions per ta in ing to the 
difficulty o f  seeing how a natura l  effect  can be immediate ly  caused by both 
,4 Durandus, Disputation 5, Question 1. 
,5 A question arises as to whether Durandus equivocates in his criterion for individuating 
actions. Are actions individuated by the powers that produce them or by their termini, i.e., 
effects? 
,6 This is not to say, however, that God need not have acted at some previous time for the 
effect in question to be realized now. On Durandus' view God is not a proximate cause of the effect. 
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God and a creature. Durandus solves the problem by denying that God is the 
immediate cause of every natural effect. The possibility remains open, how- 
ever, to adopt the other obvious solution by denying that natural entities are 
the causes of the effects associated with them, and consequently that God is 
the immediate and sole cause of every natural effect. This is the central doc- 
trine of occasionalism. 
2.  M C G U I R E ' S  I N T E R P R E T A T I O N  
Occasionalism is sometimes introduced in histories of philosophy as if it were 
merely a desperate attempt to save Cartesianism from the mind-body prob- 
lem. For this reason Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) is the thinker most 
often associated with this doctrine.'7 Actually this position was most fully 
developed in the medieval period by al-Ghazali (ao58-1111), an Islamic 
thinker, in order to provide a philosophical justification for the possibility of 
miracles, and by Gabriel Biel (141o-1495), a Catholic (like Malebranche), in 
order to explain the metaphysics of transubstantiation. ~s According to all 
these thinkers there are no causal agents in nature besides God (or, perhaps, 
other moral agents). The distinction between "primary" and "secondary" 
causes is really superfluous since there is only one cause for all that happens--  
God's will. Despite popular belief and appearances to the contrary, natural 
entities make no causal contributions to the phenomena usually associated 
with them. Even "passive" causal contributions are precluded on this view: 
Not only are there no creatures which can act so as to bring about a given 
effect, but there are not even any essential natures associated with things in 
nature which restrict the range of effects that follow from their being acted 
upon. 
AI-Ghazali's arguments in support of occasionalism are illustrative of the 
considerations that could be mustered in its behalf. His aim was to refute the 
view, held by certain "heretics of our time" (i.e., Moslem philosophers, notably 
al-Farabi and ibn-Sina [Avicenna]), that a departure from the natural course 
of events is impossible. Such a position was recognized as denying the possibil- 
,7 For an expression of his occasionalism see Book Six, Part Two, Chapters 1-  3 (437-52) of 
his The Search after Truth, and Elucidation Fifteen (657-85) of his Elucidations of the Search after 
Truth, translated from the French by Thomas M. Lennon and PaulJ. Olscamp (Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 198o ). 
,8 AI-Ghazali, Tahafut aI-Falasifah: The Incoherence of the Philosophers, translated into English by 
Sabih Ahmad Kamali (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, x963). See Problem XVII, pp. 
a 85-  ~96 ("Refutation of their Belief in the Impossibility of a Departure from the Natural Course 
of Events"). Gabriel Biel, Collectorium circa Quattour Libros Sententiarum. Auspiciis Hanns Ruckert 
collaborantibus Martino Elze et Renata Steiger, ediderunt  Wilfridus Werbeck et Udo Hofmann 
(Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]). See Book IV, Part 1, Dist. l, part 1. 
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ity o f  miracles,  such as the  s tory re la ted  in C h a p t e r  3 o f  the  book  o f  Daniel  
(which al-Ghazal i  accepted) ,  in which th ree  y o u n g  m e n  are  t h r o w n  into a 
blazing f u r n a c e  (which c o n s u m e s  thei r  guards) ,  yet  e m e r g e  u n h a r m e d .  A1- 
Ghazali  a t t r ibu ted  the  disbel ief  in such a miracle  to an  uncri t ical  accep tance  o f  
Aristotle,  whose  views s eemed  to entail  that  na tura l  entities such as fire were  
possessed o f  necessary  p rope r t i e s  whose  effects,  in n o r m a l  c i rcumstances ,  
could  no t  be i m p e d e d .  
His r e sponse  was to a r g u e  that  " the  connec t ion  be tween  what  are  bel ieved 
to be the  cause and  ef fec t  is no t  necessary."  " T a k e  for  instance any two things,  
such a s . . .  b u r n i n g  and  contac t  with fire . . . .  T h e y  are  c o n n e c t e d  as the resul t  
o f  the  Decree  o f  G o d  (holy be His name) ,  which p r e c e d e d  their  existence. I f  
one  follows the  o the r ,  it is because  he has c rea ted  t h e m  in tha t  fashion,  no t  
because  the  c o n n e c t i o n  in itself is necessary  and  indissoluble." '9 Suppose  that  
we take a piece o f  co t ton  and  place it in a flame. T h e  ph i losophers  claim that  
" the fire a lone  is the  a g e n t  o f  b u r n i n g ,  and  that  be ing an  agen t  by na tu r e  (not  
by choice),  it c a n n o t  r e f r a in  f r o m  d o i n g  what  is its na tu r e  to dry- -af te r  it comes  
into con tac t  with a subject  which is recept ive  to it." This  is precisely what  al- 
Ghazal i  denies :  "We say that  it is G o d  w h o . . ,  is the agen t  o f  blackness in the 
cot ton,  o f  the  d i s in tegra t ion  o f  its parts,  and  o f  their  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  into a 
s m o u l d e r i n g  h e a p  o f  ashes." Fire, as an inan imate  thing,  has no  p o w e r  to 
b r ing  a b o u t  effects.  T h e  only  a r g u m e n t  to the c o n t r a r y  is f r o m  the observa-  
t ion o f  the  fact o f  b u r n i n g  at the t ime o f  contac t  with fire. "But  observa t ion  
only  shows that  o n e  is with the o ther ,  no t  that  it is by it and  has no o t h e r  cause 
than  it. ''~~ It  follows tha t  since G o d  is the cause o f  every event  that  h a p p e n s  in 
na ture ,  t he re  is no  reason  to d o u b t  tha t  miracles are  possible. Miracles are  
s imply instances w h e r e  G o d  (who is comple te ly  free) chooses  to act in a way 
which is c o n t r a r y  to o u r  o r d i n a r y  exper ience .  
I t  is i m p o r t a n t  to be qui te  clear  abou t  the  view be ing  p r o p o u n d e d  here .  
W h e n  the  co t ton  is p laced in the  flame, the  fire makes  no causal con t r ibu t ion  
at all to the  b l acken ing  o f  the  cot ton.  T h e  p h e n o m e n o n  is comple te ly  the 
result  o f  God ' s  will. Since God ' s  will is f ree  H e  could,  if  H e  so desired,  make  
the co t ton  t u r n  in to  a pe r sona l  c o m p u t e r  over  the  fire. ~ T h a t  He  does no t  can 
19 AI-Ghazali, a8 5. 
,o ibid. 
21 AI-Ghazali uses more homely examples to illustrate this point: "One who left a book in his 
house might return to find it transformed into a slave-boy intelligent and resourceful; or into an 
animal. Or having left a slave-boy in the house, one may return to find him transformed into a 
dog . . . .  And when asked concerning the change, he may say: 'I do not know what is now in the 
house. All I know is that I left a book there. Perhaps now it has turned into a horse, defiling my 
library with its excrement.' " The possibilities on this view, evidently, are only limited by one's 
imagination: "So one who sees a man whom he had not seen until now might hesitate to guess 
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be expla ined  only on the supposi t ion that  He  acts in a consistent m a n n e r  
(which we mistakenly r ega rd  as immutab le  "laws of  nature")  so that  we hu- 
mans  can get a long reasonably well in the world. One  o f  the consequences of  
this view is that  na tura l  entities do not have "natures"  in the sense of  necessary 
proper t ies  associated with them.  Fire is no more  hot than  is ice. I t  is simply 
that in the presence  of  fire, God raises the t e m p e r a t u r e  of  nearby  objects. 
Nature ,  on this view, is complete ly  inert  and  consequently entirely d e p e n d e n t  
on God ' s  causal power  for  its diverse p h e n o m e n a .  "~ 
McGuire  adopts  an occasionalist in terpre ta t ion of  Boyle in o rde r  to over- 
throw the "received opinion."  I t  mus t  be admit ted  that  he claims early on in his 
p a p e r  that  he is not equat ing  Boyle's position with occasionalism: " T h e  'mechani-  
cal phi losophy '  o f  Boyle and  o ther  seventeenth-century  t h i n k e r s . . ,  must  be 
sharply dis t inguished f rom the philosophies o f  na ture  associated w i t h . . ,  the 
occasionalism o f  Malebranche,  and  the idealism of  Berkeley."~3 He  under -  
stands Malebranche ' s  solution to the p rob lem of  the relat ionship between God 
and na ture  quite well: " M a l e b r a n c h e . . .  deve loped  an occasionalist solution to 
the problem.  [He] denied  t ranseunt  causation a m o n g  physical p h e n o m e n a  . . . .  
God is the only causally active agent  in na ture  . . . .  For Malebranche,  since God 
is the t rue  cause, all 'na tura l  causes'  are merely  'occasions'  o f  Divine will."~4 A 
little later  he  states that"[Boyle]  did not accept occasionalism. ''25 
Yet one wonders  whe the r  McGuire  really unders tands  what occasionalism 
is. T h r o u g h o u t  the r e m a i n d e r  of  his p a p e r  he makes r emarks  which indicate 
that  he thinks that  for  Boyle as well na ture  is completely inert, having no causal 
power  whatsoever .  For Boyle, " T h e  laws of  p h e n o m e n a  and  their  p roper t ies  
are not  interrelated.  ''~6 For both  Boyle and  Berkeley "only God can act caus- 
atively."~7 "Since there  are no agents on na ture  [for Boyle], there  can be no t rue  
causation in the physical realm. Like Berkeley af ter  him, Boyle adheres  to the 
doctr ine that  only mora l  agents,  responsible for their  behavior,  are capable o f  
whether that man was born at all. He might say: 'Maybe, this man was one of the fruits sold in the 
market. But now the fruit has been transformed into a man, because God has power over every 
thing, and all such transformations are therefore possible'" (189). Fortunately, however, al- 
though all these things are possible, "God has created for us the knowledge that He would not do 
these things" (ibid.). 
22 For a classic response to al-Ghazali's Tahafut al-Falisifah: The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 
see ibn-Rushd (Averroes) (1126-1198), Tahafut al-Tahafut: The Incoherence of The Incoherence, 
translated from the Arabic with introduction and notes by Simon van den Bergh (London: Luzac, 
1954), especially q. 17. 
23 McGuire, 525 . 
24 ibid., 531. 
9 5 ibid., 532. 
26 ibid., 528. 
27 ibid., 537. 
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c a u s a t i v e  ac t i on .  ''~8 H e  c o n c l u d e s :  " T h u s ,  t h o u g h  p h y s i c a l  ob j ec t s  a p p e a r  to  
act  so  as to  b r i n g  a b o u t  c h a n g e s ,  in r e a l i t y  t r u e  causa l  p o w e r  c a n n o t  b e  as- 
c r i b e d  to  t h e m .  T h e r e f o r e  B o y l e  i m p l i c i t l y  e x p r e s s e d  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  c a u s a t i o n  is 
s o m e t h i n g  i m p o s e d  u p o n  o b s e r v e d  r e g u l a r i t y  in n a t u r e  by  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g  
p o w e r  o f  t h e  h u m a n  mind ."~9  T h e  a l m o s t  p o i n t - f o r - p o i n t  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  o f  
M c G u i r e ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  w i t h  a l - G h a z a l i ' s  v i e w  is a r r e s t i n g .  
O n e  c o u l d  t a k e  i s sue  w i t h  M c G u i r e ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o n  s e v e r a l  g r o u n d s . s o  
T h e  m o s t  d a m a g i n g  is t h e  e x e g e t i c a l  p o i n t  t h a t  it fai ls  to a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  
n u m e r o u s  p a s s a g e s  in  B o y l e ' s  w r i t i n g s  w h i c h  u n d o u b t e d l y  g a v e  r i se  to  t h e  
" r e c e i v e d  o p i n i o n "  in  t h e  f i rs t  p l a c e - - t h o s e  p a s s a g e s  in w h i c h  h e  a p p e a r s  to  
m i n i m i z e  G o d ' s  i m m e d i a t e  c a u s a l  ac t iv i ty  in n a t u r e .  A n  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t ex t s  
f r o m  his m o s t  s u s t a i n e d  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  G o d  a n d  na -  
t u r e  r e f l e c t i n g  his  m a t u r e  v i ews  o n  t h e  s u b j e c t - - A  Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly 
Received Notion of  Nature ( 1 6 8 6 ) - - b e a r s  th is  out .3,  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a s s a g e  is 
,8 ibid., 536 . 
,9 ibid. 
so One of these, which I do not intend to dwell on here, is his use of texts from Boyle's works. 
He sometimes fails to read a given passage in context. For example, on pages 535-36 of his paper 
he gives a quote from The Christian Virtuoso to support his interpretation. He fails to mention that 
in the passage in question Boyle is informing the reader of what the Cartesians hold, and that from 
the context it is not clear what Boyle thought about this. Another problem consists in paying 
attention to only part of a given text. In the same quote, for examp[e, he emphasizes that local 
motion is "every moment continued and preserved immediately by God," which naturally lends 
itself to an occasionalist reading, but ignores the rest of the passage where Boyle infers from this 
that God "'concurs to the actions of each particular agent," which suggests that agents other than 
God have causal power. In this paper I want to focus not on these shortcomings of McGuire's 
article, but rather on the adequacy of the interpretation he proposes for understanding the view 
of God and nature expressed in Boyle's writings. 
s, Robert Boyle, A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature (1686), in The Works of 
the Honourable Robert Boyle, Vol. 5 (London, 1772 ). This is a six volume resetting of the x744 
edition edited by Thomas Birch. This edition will hereafter be referred to as Works. Since my 
arguments throughout this paper will be based largely on what it is possible to infer from Boyle's 
published writings, something should be said about the texts I am using. I am sensitive to the 
complaint, made by an anonymous referee for this journal, that it is very eccentric to use an 
inauthoritative eighteenth-century edition of  a seventeenth-century author for a twentieth- 
century reader. However, I am also persuaded by M. A. Stewart's argument (in the Preface to his 
Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979) that at 
this time it is not clear that any replication of Boyle's original editions would be authoritative in 
the sense of being virtually free of error, for the simple reason that they were not often well 
prepared either for or by the printer. The 1772 edition used here is likely to differ from a final 
critical edition mainly in such incidentals as spelling, punctuation technique, and typographic 
conventions. For our purposes it is not crucial to have in our possession a critical edition of Boyle's 
works. Because the argument of the present paper is built from a consideration of many passages 
from several of Boyle's treatises, it is unlikely that slight differences from one edition to another 
would have a bearing on the substance of this paper. I can only beg readers to point out to me any 
places where a more authoritative edition would materially affect the interpretation proposed 
here. 
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typical :  "I  a sc r ibe  to the  w i s d o m  o f  G o d  in t he  first  fabr ic  o f  t he  un ive r se ,  
which  he  so a d m i r a b l y  c o n t r i v e d ,  that ,  i f  he  b u t  c o n t i n u e  his o r d i n a r y  a n d  
g e n e r a l  c o n c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  will be  no  necess i ty  o f  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  i n t e r p o s i t i o n ,  
which  m a y  r e d u c e  h i m  to seem,  as it were ,  to p lay  a f t e r - g a m e s ;  all t hose  
ex igenc ies ,  u p o n  w h o s e  a c c o u n t  p h i l o s o p h e r s  a n d  phys ic i ans  s eems  to have  
d e v i s e d  w h a t  t hey  call  n a t u r e ,  b e i n g  f o r e s e e n  a n d  p r o v i d e d  fo r  in t he  first  
fabr ic  o f  t he  world."3~ Such  a view, he  th inks ,  bes ides  b e i n g  t rue ,  also does  
m o r e  h o n o r  to t h e  C r e a t o r  t h a n  a n y  o t h e r :  
[A]s it more recommends  the skill o f  an engineer  to contrive an elaborate engine so, as 
that there should need nothing to reach his ends in it but the contrivances of  parts 
devoid of  unders tanding,  than if it were necessary, that ever and anon a discreet 
servant should be employed to concur notably to the operations of  this or that part,  or 
to h inder  the engine from being out  of  order ;  so it more sets off  the wisdom of  God in 
the fabric of  the universe, that he can make so vast a machine per form all those many 
things, which he designed it should, by the meer  contrivance of  brute  matter  managed 
by certain laws o f  local motion and upheld by his ordinary and general concourse, than 
if he employed from time to time an intelligent overseer, such as nature is fancied to 
be, to regulate, assist, and controul  the motions of  the parts.3~ 
T o  m a k e  his view m o r e  vivid  h e  a p p e a l s  t ime  a n d  a g a i n  to t he  c lock m e t a p h o r  
which  c r o p s  u p  so o f t e n  in s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  writers.a4 
[A]ccording to us, [the world] is like a rare clock, such as may be that at Strasburgh, 
where all things are so skilfully contrived, that the engine being once set a moving, all 
things proceed,  according to the artificer's first design, and the motions of  the little 
statues, that at such hours per form these or  those things, do not require, like those of  
puppets ,  the peculiar  interposing of  the artificer, or  any intelligent agent employed by 
him, but per form their  functions upon particular occasions, by virtue of  the general  
and primitive contrivance of  the whole engine.35 
O n  M c G u i r e ' s  occas iona l i s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  n a t u r a l  en t i t ies  a r e  d e n i e d  p o w e r  o f  
any  sor t .  T h a t  Boy le  t h i n k s  n a t u r a l  en t i t i es  d o  have  p o w e r ,  in t r a n s m i t t i n g  
s2 Free Inquiry, Works, 5: 163. 
s3 ibid., 169. 
s4 Cf. Larry Laudan, "The Clock Metaphor and Hypotheses: The Impact of Descartes on 
English Methodological Thought, 165o-167o," in his Science and Hypothesis (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 
1981 ), and Rose-Mary Sargent, "Robert Boyle's Baconian Inheritance: A Response to Laudan's 
Cartesian Thesis," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 17, no. 4 (Dec 1986): 469-86. 
33 Free Inquiry, Works, 5: 163. It is worth noting that the clock metaphor in this passage is 
being favorably contrasted in the immediately preceding text with a different metaphor which is 
better suited to convey the essence of occasionalism: "[M]ethinks the difference betwixt their 
[certain philosophers'] opinion of God's agency in the world, and that, which I would propose, 
may be somewhat adumbrated by saying, that they seem to imagine the world to be after the 
nature of a puppet, whose contrivance indeed may be very artificial, but yet is such, that almost 
every particular motion the artificer is fain (by drawing sometimes one wire or string, sometimes 
another) to guide and oftentimes over-rule the actions of the engine." 
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motion to one another, is evident in the following passage: "[I]t is intelligible 
to me, that God should at the beginning impress determinate motions upon 
the parts of  matter, and guide them, as he thought requisite, for the primor- 
dial constitution of things; and that ever since he should, by his ordinary and 
general concourse, maintain these powers, which he gave to the parts of 
matter, to transmit their motion thus and thus to one another."3 6 In a striking 
passage he sums up the view he is proposing: "According to the foregoing 
hypothesis, I consider the frame of the world already made, as a great, and, if 
I may so speak, pregnant automaton, t h a t . . ,  in conjunction with the laws of 
motion, freely established, and still maintained by God, among its parts, I look 
upon as a complex principle, whence result the settled order or course of 
things corporeal."37 
Such passages, which attribute power to the "parts of matter," must be 
counted as anomalies on McGuire's interpretation.~ s Unless we are willing to 
exercise an inordinate amount of interpretative creativity in our analysis of 
such texts, the inescapable concIusion is that Boyle accepted secondary causa- 
tion in the natural realm. It would be a mistake to conclude from this, how- 
ever, that the "received opinion" is right after all, and that he embraced 
metaphysical deism. If  we take seriously his remarks about the necessity of 
God's "ordinary and general concourse" for maintaining the laws of motion, 
then God's causal activity in nature entails more than merely the conservation 
of individual things in existence. Such an admission rules out metaphysical 
deism in the strict sense. A satisfactory interpretation of Boyle's writings on 
God and nature must do justice to both divine and secondary causal contribu- 
tions to natural phenomena. Both McGuire's and the received opinion's inter- 
pretations err by acknowleding only part of the causal picture. Is it possible to 
do better? 
3- B O Y L E  AS A C O N C U R R E N T I S T  
I think it is possible to do better. Appreciating the subtlety of Boyle's view 
requires, once again, familiarity with the detailed consideration the problem 
received at the hands of certain scholastic philosophers. The extreme posi- 
tions of  deism and occasionalism are not the only solutions historically avail- 
able. Understanding a third philosophical option on this question will help us 
to bring Boyle's view into clearer focus. 
~s ibid., 17 o. 
aT ihid., t 79- 
~s See also The Origin of Forms and Qualities According to the Corpuscular Phdosophy, Works, 3:42:  
"'For the world being once const i tu ted by the  great  A u t h o r  o f  things as it now is, l look upon  the 
p h a e n o m e n a  o f  na tu re  to be caused  by the  local mot ion  o f  one  par t  o f  ma t te r  bi t t ing against  
ano ther . "  
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T h e  view o f  the re la t ionship between God  and na ture  that  I wish to de- 
scribe here  may be called concurrentism ( f rom the Latin concursus, literally 
" runn ing  together") .  In  the medieval  per iod the best known spokesman  for  
this view was T h o m a s  Aquinas (1225-1274).39 An interestingly d i f fe ren t  ver- 
sion was deve loped  in the early m o d e r n  per iod by Luis de Molina (1535-  
1600). 40 A host  o f  o the r  scholastic phi losophers  deve loped  variations on these 
two approaches .4 '  
Concur ren t i sm in any o f  its versions can be unders tood  as an a t t empt  to 
cut a middle  way between the ex t remes  of  deism and occasionalism by recog- 
nizing the causal contr ibut ions  made  to natural  p h e n o m e n a  by both God and 
natural  entities. On  the one  hand,  it was clear to thinkers  such as Aquinas that  
natural  entities do, con t ra ry  to occasionalists like al-Ghazali, make  some char-  
acteristic causal contr ibut ions  to the p h e n o m e n a  usually associated with them. 
"Some have unde r s tood  God to work in every agent  in such a way that no 
created power  has any effect  in things, but  that  God alone is the immedia te  
cause o f  every th ing  wrought ;  for  instance, that  it is not fire that  gives heat, but  
God in the fire, and  so forth."4, But  this, he  says, is impossible. T o  begin with, 
it is evident  to the senses that  effects follow f rom the causal proper t ies  o f  
things. We observe that  the fire causes the cotton to turn  black.4~ In  addit ion,  it 
is rationally fitting that  things in na ture  br ing about  effects, since it would be 
cont rary  to the divine wisdom that  there  should be anyth ing  useless in the 
created realm. " Indeed ,  all things created would seem, in a way, to be purpose -  
less, if  they lacked an opera t ion  p r o p e r  to them;  since the pu rpose  o f  every- 
thing is its operation."44 On  the o ther  hand,  grant ing  al l - su f f i c iency  to the 
causal powers  o f  na tura l  entities, as metaphysical  deists do, has the undesir-  
able consequence  o f  mak ing  God seem irrelevant  to goings on in the physical 
order .  Only one  conclusion seemed possible: "We must  the re fo re  unde r s t and  
sg Saint Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (On the Power of God), Question 
3, Article 7; Summa contra Gentiles Book III, Part l, chaps. 64-67, 69, 7 o, 75-77; and Summa 
Theologiae, Book I, Questions lo 3 and 1o 5. 
4o Luis de Molina, Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestina- 
tione, et Preprobatione (Concordia) (Oniae: Collegium Maximum S.I., 1953), Part If, Disputations 
25-28. 
4, See also Francisco Suarez 0548-1617), Disputationes Metaphysicae (Hildesheim: Georg 
Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965), Disputations 18, 22; as noted above, Boyle quotes extensively 
from this work; Johannes Duns Scotus (1265-13o8), Quaestiones Quodlibetales---God and Creatures: 
The Quodlibetal Questions, translated with an introduction, notes, and glossary by Felix Alluntis and 
Allan B. Wolter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); William of Ockham (1285-1349), 
Reportatio II, q-3 (especially pp. 6o-66, 7 o, and 72-75) in G. Gal and R. Wood, eds., Ockham: Opera 
Theologica, vol. 5, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1981 ). 
4, Summa Theologiae q. 1o5, a. 5. 
4~ Summa contra Gentiles Book III, part 1, chap. 69. 
44 ibid. 
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that God works in things in such a manne r  that things have also their  p r o p e r  
operation. 'q5 
It was then incumbent  on Aquinas to articulate the nature  of  the contribu- 
tions by God  and  natural  entities, and how these could be integrated in the 
causation o f  natural  phenomena .  His solution is encapsulated in the following 
statement: "God is the cause o f  everything's action inasmuch as he gives every- 
thing the power  to act, and preserves it in being and applies it to action, and 
inasmuch as by his power  every o ther  power acts.'46 On this view God can be 
said to "assist" a secondary cause's action in four  ways: 
(1) God gives the secondary cause its intrinsic power. (creation) 
(~) God conserves the secondary cause's intrinsic power. (conservation) 
(3) God applies the secondary cause's intrinsic power to its characteristic ef- 
fect. (application) 
(4) God supplies needed  extrinsic power to the secondary cause. (operation)47 
Creation is the br inging into existence of  a natural entity belonging to a 
de te rmina te  species o f  thing, complete with the powers usually associated with 
that sort o f  thing. Conservat ion o f  a secondary cause is the maintenance of  
that thing in existence; this is requi red  because o f  the essential cont ingency o f  
all created things. Application involves God directing the secondary cause to 
its appropr ia te  end,  and thus doing something to the secondary cause. Opera-  
tion involves God fu r the r  empower ing  the secondary cause, and acting t h rough  
the secondary cause to br ing about  the given effect. (A deist like Durandus  
would accept both creat ion and conservation in these terms, but  would reject 
divine application and operat ion.)  Aquinas'  view can be unders tood  by way o f  
an analogy. In o rde r  for  a pen to funct ion in writing it must both begin to exist 
as an ins t rument  suitable for  writing and cont inue to exist as such f rom mo- 
ment  to moment .  But if it is to bring about  a specific effect it must also be 
applied to some writing surface and be moved in a certain way. T h e  person 
(who is a principle cause) acts th rough  the pen (the instrumental  cause) to 
p roduce  the written words (the single effect). 
Because an instrument is in a manner the cause of the principal cause's effect, not by its 
own form or power, but in so far as it participates somewhat in the power of the 
principal cause through being moved thereby: thus the axe is the cause of the crafts- 
man's handiwork not by its own form or power, but by the power of the craftsman who 
moves it so that it participates in his power . . . .  Just as it clearly cannot be given to the 
45 De Potentia q.3, a.7. 
46 ibid. 
47 ibid., and Summa Theologiae. In the Summa contra Gentiles the distinction between "applica- 
tion" and "operation" is collapsed. 
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craftsman's instrument to work unless it be moved by him, so neither can it be given to 
a natural thing to operate without the divine operation.48 
Application and opera t ion  by God are necessary because the secondary cause, 
on Aquinas'  view, lacks the power  to move itself to action. "In every agent, in 
fact, there  are two things to consider:  namely, the thing itself that acts, and the 
power by which it acts."49 In natural  entities, at least, these two things are 
distinct. It is not  the case on this view, he emphasizes, that the same effect is 
at t r ibuted to a natural  cause and to divine power in such a way that it is partly 
done  by God, and partly done  by the natural  agent. Rather, "it is wholly done  
by both, according to a d i f ferent  way, just  as the same effect is wholly attrib- 
uted to the ins t rument  and also wholly to the principal agent."5o In this way he 
hopes to preserve the integrity o f  both divine and secondary causation in 
nature.  
Molina agreed  with Aquinas that both God and secondary causes contrib- 
ute to the produc t ion  o f  natural  phenomena ,  but  denied that in bringing 
about  a given effect  God acts on  and th rough  a secondary agent. He takes 
issue with Aquinas'  analogy by pointing out  that there  are two kinds o f  instru- 
ments th rough  which an agent  might  work. One sort requires constant opera- 
tion and application o f  a principal agent  in o rde r  to p roduce  the effect. 
" T h e r e  are some which do not have the full power to operate,  such as the 
instruments o f  the artist. And these require  the motion and direction of  some 
o ther  agent  in o rde r  to effect  anything."5~ T h e  second sort of  instrument,  o f  
which semen f rom a fa ther  and heat  f rom a fire are the examples he men- 
tions, has its own power  to act independent ly  o f  its agent. "And if instruments  
of  this sort are aptly positioned, they require  no additional motion or direction 
from the principal causes."52 He  points out  that in the fo rmer  case it is clear 
that the ins t rument  does not contain the whole power to act and so it cannot  
truly be said that the effect  proceeds wholly f rom it, even on its own o rde r  o f  
causality. I f  natural  causes are o f  the latter sort, however, then God's assis- 
tance is unnecessary since they may produce  their effect even after  the agent  
has ceased to exist. In short,  Molina thinks, Aquinas' analogy fails because 
ei ther  natural  entities are not  truly the causes of  the effects associated with 
them, being mere  ins t ruments  in God's hand,  or else they require  no assis- 
48 De Potentia, q.3, a-7, reply to seventh objection; cf. Summa contra Gentiles Book ItI, part l, 
chap. 7 ~ . 
a0 Summa contra Gentiles Book III, part 1, chap. 7 o. 
50 ibid. 
s, Concordia, part II, q. 1 4, disp. ~6. 
52 ibid. 
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tance f rom God in o rde r  to br ing about  their  effects, in which case God's 
assistance is unnecessary.  Nei ther  is a satisfactory result. 
On Molina's view a secondary cause is not a t rue cause unless it can move 
itself without first being moved by another .  His own account of  concurrence  is 
there fore  f ounded  on an analogy o f  cooperat ion between God and secondary 
causes: T h e y  act simultaneously and in virtue of  their actions taken together  
they p roduce  a given effect. T h e  natural  entity's contr ibution consists in the 
exercise o f  its specific powers to bring about  the effect. God's contr ibution 
consists of  conserving the effect brought  about  by the secondary cause. (Thus 
Molina's view would differ,  if  only slightly, f rom the deistic view which focuses 
only on God's conservation o f  the secondary causes in existence.) Unlike the 
Thomist ic  view according to which God and the natural  cause are each said to 
be sufficient conditions for  the effect, on the Molinist view the action o f  each is 
a necessary condit ion for  the product ion  of  the effect, and together  they are 
sufficient. "It  follows that God's general  concurrence  is not an action of  God's 
on the secondary cause, as though the secondary cause acted and p roduced  its 
effect af ter  having been moved;  rather,  it is an action immediately with the 
cause on its action and effect ."~ 
An interest ing feature  of  Molina's view is that there  is a kind of  pre- 
established ha rmony  between God's action and that o f  the secondary cause. 
God foreorda ined  f rom eterni ty to conserve the effect o f  a secondary cause at 
the instant the secondary cause brings it about. This is t rue  even in the case of  
miracles, "in which He who foreknows all fu ture  things has by the eternal 
de terminat ion  o f  His will decided to suspend the influence in question and in 
the service o f  some higher  end to miraculously withhold that influence f rom 
the secondary causes."54 This account of  concurrence-as-cooperat ion plays a 
central role in his explication o f  the miracle recorded  in Daniel: " I f  God did 
not coopera te  with a secondary cause, He surely would not have been able to 
bring it about  that the Babylonian fire did not burn  the three young men . . . .  
T h e r e f o r e , . . .  it should be claimed without doubt  that God cooperates with 
secondary causes, and it was only because God did not concur  with the fire in 
its action that the young  men were not consumed by the fire."s5 
In summary,  Aquinas and Molina sought to articulate views according to 
which secondary causes are  not  superf luous (as they are in occasionalism), nor  
in which God's causal role in na ture  is minimized (as it is in deism). Concur-  
rentism (in e i ther  of  its forms) can be described as an a t tempt  at a via media 
5s ibid. 
54 ibid. 
~5 ibid., part 1I, q. 14, disp. 25. 
564 J O U R N A L  OF T H E  H I S T O R Y  OF P H I L O S O P H Y  26:4 O C T O B E R  1 9 8 8  
between what were seen as unacceptable extreme positions. Although each of 
these views was fleshed out with many subtle details omitted in the foregoing 
sketch, enough has been said to permit us to see how Boyle's various remarks 
can be profitably interpreted along concurrentist lines.56 
In order to construe Boyle as a concurrentist it must be shown that he 
understood events in nature to involve immedidate causal activity on the part 
of both God and natural entities.57 In the criticisms of McGuire's interpreta- 
tion above we saw several passages in which Boyle takes for granted that God 
and natural entities each play causal roles in nature, and such passages could 
be multiplied. In each he emphasizes that God's "ordinary and general con- 
course" is necessary to maintain the laws of motion governing the interactions 
of bodies. An intriguing clue bearing on the nature of this interaction is sug- 
gested in the following passage from his Essay Containing a requisite Digression 
concerning those, that would exclude the Deity from intermeddling with Matter ( 1663): 
"[T]he quill, that a philosopher writes with, being dipted in ink, and then 
moved after such and such a manner upon white paper, all which are corpo- 
real things, or their motions, may very well trace an excellent rational dis- 
course; but the quill would never have been moved after the requisite manner 
upon the paper, had not its motion been guided and regulated by the under- 
standing of the writer."s8 Just as a pen, which is an inanimate thing, requires 
for its proper operation that its motion be "guided and regulated by the 
understanding of the writer," so too, Boyle says, the matter which makes up 
the universe, being suitably figured and moved, performs a great many things 
which it could not were it left to itself and not directed by an intelligent 
agent.59 The similarity to Aquinas' view, right down to the analogy used to 
convey it, should not go unnoticed. 
Besides such indirect evidence, there are other indications pertaining to 
the nature of Boyle's view. Recall that occasionalism was originally a response 
to the rejection of miracles based on adherence to a doctrine of the necessity 
36 Problems a nd  ques t ions  r e ma i n  conce rn ing  the  details of  both  of  these  views. O n  the  
Thomis t ic  view both  God a nd  the  na tura l  enti ty are  said to be sufficient condit ions for the  effect. 
But  then  it is difficult to see how one  o f  the  causes fails to be superf luous .  On  the Molinist view 
God and  the na tura l  cause  coopera te  toge ther  like two m e n  pull ing a boat. (See Concordia, part  II, 
q. 14, disp. 25) But  does this m e a n  that  God could not  br ing about  the  effect  wi thout  the  second 
cause? Doesn ' t  this c o m p r o m i s e  God 's  omnipo tence?  
57 T h e  s t ronge r  moda l  claim to the  effect  that  natural  entities cannot br ing  about  natura l  
p h e n o m e n a  wi thout  God 's  assistance is not  necessary in o rder  to cons t rue  Boyle as a concur~ 
rentist. T h e  p resen t  fo rmula t ion  is i n t ended  to be neutra l  on this quest ion.  
5s An Essay Containing a requisite Digression concerning those, that would exclude the Deity from 
intermeddling with Matter, in Some Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Phi- 
losophy, Works ~: 4 8. 
39 ibid. 
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of  nature .  Concur ren t i sm,  in turn,  was developed as a response  to occa- 
sionalism while t rying to avoid the opposi te  e r ro r  o f  suppos ing  that  natural  
entities p roduce  effects independen t ly  o f  God assistance. As we saw with 
Molina, this requ i red  an account  o f  how miracles are possible. How one under -  
stands God ' s  special prov idence  in the metaphysics  o f  miracles, consequently,  
reflects one 's  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  the metaphysics  o f  God's  general  providence.  
In  his treatise Some Considerations about the Reconcileableness of  Reason and 
Religion ( 1675 ), Boyle writes: 
[I]f we consider God as the author of the universe, and the free establisher of the laws 
of motion, whose general concourse is necessary to the conservation and efficacy of 
every particular physical agent, we cannot but acknowledge, that, by with-holding his 
concourse, or changing these laws of motion, which depend perfectly on his will, he 
may invalidate most, if not all the axioms and theorems of natural philosophy: these 
supposing the course of nature, and especially the established laws of motion, among 
the parts of the universal matter, as those upon which all the phaenomena depend. 6~ 
Notice again the emphas is  on the necessity of  God's  "general  concourse"  for  
the causal efficacy o f  every physical agent.  This  is the essence of  his view of  the 
m a n n e r  o f  God 's  activity in the ord inary  course o f  nature .  He  then  immedi-  
ately uses this doct r ine  to explain God's  special providence  in the protect ion 
and  rescue o f  Daniel 's  fr iends:  "I t  is a rule in natural  philosophy,  that causae 
necessariae semper agunt quantum possunt; but it will not follow f rom thence, that  
the fire mus t  necessarily bu rn  Daniel's three  companions ,  or  their  clothes, that  
were cast by the Babylonian king's c o m m a n d  into the midst  o f  a bu rn ing  fiery 
furnace,  when  the au tho r  o f  na ture  was pleased to withdraw his concourse  to 
the opera t ion  o f  the flames, or  superna tura l ly  to de fend  against them the 
bodies, that  were  exposed  to them.  ''6~ Discussing this incident  in his treatise on 
the Resurrect ion he writes: 
For, supposing the truth of the history of the scriptures, we may observe, that the 
power of God has already extended itself to the performance of such things, as import 
as much as we need infer, sometimes by suspending the natural actings of bodies upon 
one another, and sometimes by endowing human and other bodies with preternatural 
qualities . . . .  Thus the operation of the activest body in nature, flame, was suspended 
in Nebuchadnezzer's fiery furnace, whilst Daniel's three companions walked unharmed in 
those flames, that in a thrice, consumed the kindlers of them. 6~ 
It  is significant that  in these passages he gives two alternative explanat ions for  
the possibility o f  the miracle. In  the first he suggests that  God "withdraw[s] his 
Some Considerations about the Reconcileableness of Reason and Religion, Works, 4:16 L 
61 ibid., I61-62. 
6, Some Physico-Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection, Works, 4: 2Ol- 
202. 
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concourse  to the opera t ion  of  the flames" or  "suspends" the fire's action. On 
this account  God  momenta r i ly  ceases to e m p o w e r  the fire. This  is jus t  the way 
that  Aquinas would explain the miracle. Boyle also leaves open  the possibility 
that in such a miracle God endowed  the young  men ' s  bodies with special 
qualities which p reven ted  the fire f rom having its effect  on them.  On this 
explanat ion the fire retains its natural  power  to burn,  as is evidenced by the 
fact that  the guards  were cons um ed  by it, bu t  God does not  coopera te  with the 
f lame in p roduc ing  the same effect  in the young  men.  As we saw above, this is 
the way Molina explains this miracle. Nei ther  o f  these explanat ions would be 
admissible on the deistic view according to which God does not concur  with 
the action o f  the f lames in the first place, and  does not alter physical laws af ter  
they have been established. Nei ther  is admissible on the occasionalist view 
according to which the fire has no power  of  its own which God could withdraw 
his concourse  f rom,  and  according  to which there are no natural  p roper t ies  
associated with bodies  which could be replaced by superna tura l  propert ies .  
On the o the r  hand,  each explanat ion is jus t  what one would expect  if  Boyle 
embraced  some fo rm o f  concurrent ism.  
T h e  details o f  his concur ren t i sm can be unders tood  by turn ing  to treatises, 
especially The Origin of Forms and Qualities according to the Corpuscular Philosophy 
(1666) and  The Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis (1674), in 
which he dist inguishes his own view o f  secondary causation f rom that  o f  his 
predecessors.  Because he em br aced  a d i f ferent  ontology f rom that  o f  Scholastic 
Aristotelians such as Aquinas  and  Molina, his version o f  concur ren t i sm had to 
be r e fo rmula t ed  in te rms  o f  his own phi losophy of  nature .  Central  to his "me- 
chanical phi losophy"  was the thesis that  the fo rm o f  a thing is not  a "real sub 
stance distinct f r o m  mat ter , "  as he unders tood  the Scholastic doctr ine as aff irm- 
ing, "but  only the ma t t e r  itself o f  a natural  body, considered with its peculiar  
m a n n e r  of  existence." Because such a "convention of  accidents" is sufficient to 
make a body the sort  o f  th ing it is, he appropr ia tes  for  it the t e rm 'Form'.64 
O f  the accidents const i tut ing the forms  of  natural  bodies, he considered 
local mot ion to be the most  impor tan t ,  and explicitly connected it with secon- 
63 There is a very useful discussion of whether Boyle's doctrine should be thought of as a 
modification, or as the absolute antithesis, of Aristotle's doctrine in E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechani- 
zation of the World Pzcture, translated by C. Dikshoorn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 
437-39. 
64 The Origin of Forms and Qualities according to the Corpuscular Philosophy, Works III, pp. 28-29. 
See also Free Inquiry, Works, 5:177: "[Tlhe particular nature of an individual body consists.., in a 
convention of the mechanical affections (such as bigness, figure, order, function, contexture, and 
local motion) of its parts, (whether sensible or insensible) convenient and sufficient to constitute 
in, or to intitle to, its particular species or denominations, the particular body they make up, as the 
concourse of all of these is considered as the principle of motion, rest, and changes in that body." 
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dary causation: "[L]ocal motion seems to be indeed the principal amongst 
second causes, and the grand agent of all that happens in nature: for though 
bulk, figure, rest, situation, and texture do concur to the phaenomena of 
nature, yet in comparison of motion they seem to be in many cases, effects, 
and in many others little better than conditions, or requisites, or causes sine 
quibus non, which modify the operation that one part of matter by virtue of its 
motion hath upon another."65 On this view local motion is the chief determi- 
nant of the form of a natural body. The form, in turn, determines the qualities 
associated with that sort of body. The laws governing local motion, however, 
are not intrinsic to matter once it has been created, but require God's contin- 
ued activity for their preservation: "[T]he universe being once framed by 
God, and the laws of motion being settled and all upheld by his incessant 
concourse and general providence, the phaenomena of the world thus consti- 
tuted are physically produced by the mechanical affections of the parts of 
matter, and what they operate upon one another according to mechanical 
l aws . "66  
God's contribution to the natural order is thus twofold. On the one hand 
He created matter at the beginning and set it in motion in such a way that an 
organized universe would be formed. After this initial creative act He contin- 
ues to sustain the order of the universe by maintaining the laws of motion 
which govern the mechanical interactions of the parts of matter. God's "inces- 
sant concourse and general providence" consists in conserving these laws of 
motion, and consquently the effects associated with natural bodies.67 Natural 
bodies can be said to possess causal powers in virtue of the motion they can 
impart to one another through impact, but they are incapable of sustaining 
the lawful order of the universe without the continued assistance of God. 68 
God and natural entities each play a significant causal role in a physical uni- 
verse conceived within the ontological categories of the mechanical philoso- 
phy. Accordingly, this view can most aptly be described, by borrowing a 
phrase from Boyle, as concurrentism "reconciled and accomodated to the 
notions of the corpuscular physicks.'69 
65 The Origin of Forms and Qualities according to the Corpuscular Philosophy, Works, 3: 15. 
66 About the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis, Works, 4: 68 -69 .  
67 See also The Origin of Forms and Qualities according to the Corpuscular Philosophy, Works, 3 : 4  2: 
"The  world be ing  once  const i tu ted by the  grea t  A u t h o r  o f  th ings  as it now is, I look u p o n  the 
p h a e n o m e n a  o f  na t u r e  to be caused by the  local mot ion  o f  one  part  o f  mat te r  hi t t ing against  
another . "  
68 Th i s  is pe rha ps  what  he  is sugges t ing  when  he  writes that  he "cannot  conceive, how a body 
devoid o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d  sense,  t ruly so called, can modera te  and  de t e rmine  its own motions,  
especially so, as to ma ke  t h e m  conformable  to laws, that  it has no knowledge or app rehens ion  of." 
(Free Inquiry, Works, 5:17o) .  
69 The Origin of Forms and Qualities according to the Corpuscular Philosophy, Works 3: 5. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
I wish to return briefly to the issues raised in the introduction to the foregoing 
discussion in order to underline what I see as the specific and general conse- 
quences of this study. One aim has been to demonstrate the inadequacy of 
previous accounts which misinterpret Boyle's view of God and nature by being 
insensitive to the subtlety of  the position he embraced. In this regard I hope to 
have shown that Boyle's view should be understood as a version of concur- 
rentism expressed within the context of the mechanical philosophy. Besides 
providing a coherent interpretation of his various pronouncements on the 
relationship between God and nature, an additional virtue of this interpreta- 
tion is that it explains why his writings have lent themselves to deistic and 
occasionalist readings. In the very articulation of any concurrentist view there 
is an unavoidable tendency to lean toward one or the other of the extremes. 
Aquinas' version, according to which God is the sufficient cause of every 
natural event, and in which natural entities are conceived of as instruments of 
divine power, tends dangerously close to occasionalism. Molina's version, ac- 
cording to which there is a pre-established harmony in which God cooperates 
with a secondary cause by conserving the latter's effect, risks collapsing into 
deism. The problem of coherently articulating God's relationship to nature is 
a profoundly difficult one for philosophical reasons. It should not be surpris- 
ing, therefore, that a natural philosopher like Boyle, who laid no claim to be a 
metaphysician, should express himself in ways which easily lend themselves 
(in the absence of  a careful analysis of the larger context of his writings) to 
misinterpretation. 
There is also a more general conclusion to be drawn. We began by distin- 
guishing two approaches to historiography--"intellectualist" and "social con- 
textualist." Shapin laments that despite the fact that "the central features of 
the Jacobs' contextualism have been visible in print since 1971, intellectualist 
studies of corpuscular ianism.. ,  continue to appear which make no reference, 
even of a critical nature, to their views."7o Social contextualism per se has not 
been at issue here. I do not dispute that considerations of the sort that Shapin, 
the Jacobs, and other social contextualists emphasize might well play a role in 
a complete exposition of Boyle's thought. But another possibility is equally 
worthy of consideration: that insight can be gained into Boyle's writings on the 
relationship between God and nature by understanding them as the expres- 
sion of his attempt to balance various scientific, philosophical, and theologi- 
cally grounded intellectual commitments. Any logically coherent solution 
which would avoid the extreme positions of metaphysical deism and occa- 
7o Shapin (198o), 1o6 n. 31. 
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sionalism would display the features of the view that Boyle expresses. Too 
great an emphasis on explanation in terms of social, political, and economic 
factors is likely to overlook the constraints imposed on the articulation of a 
philosophy of nature by properly intellectual considerations. It is unlikely that 
the connection between Boyle's thought and medieval discussions of God and 
nature could have been discerned without taking seriously the paradig- 
matically intellectualist task of trying to render his thought coherent. In order 
to advance further, the historiography of  seventeenth century natural philoso- 
phy must, it is evident, continue to draw upon intellectualist as well as social 
contextualist considerations. 
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